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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ERIC SCOTT SPOKAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43933
Ada County Case No.
CR-2015-9992

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Spokas failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by imposing
an underlying unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, upon his guilty plea to
aggravated assault?

Spokas Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Spokas pled guilty, via an Alford 1 plea, to aggravated assault and the district
court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, suspended the
sentence, and placed Spokas on supervised probation for four years. (R., pp.49, 85-
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92.) Spokas filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.9496.)
Spokas asserts his underlying sentence is excessive in light of his alcohol use,
his status as a first-time felon, because he and the victim “were attempting to reconcile
at the change of plea hearing,” and because, he claims, the district court may have
sentenced him to a longer term “because of his Alford plea.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.2-4.)
The record supports the sentence imposed.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id.
The maximum prison sentence for aggravated assault is five years. I.C. § 18906. The district court imposed an underlying unified sentence of four years, with two
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years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines.

(R., pp.85-92.)

Furthermore, Spokas’ underlying sentence is appropriate in light of the seriousness of
the offense, his history of criminal offending, his refusal to accept responsibility for his
criminal conduct, his denial he has a substance abuse or anger problem, his lack of
amenability to treatment, and his high risk to reoffend.
Spokas has a lengthy criminal history that spans at least four states and includes
convictions for “DC-Offensive of Risk of Harm,” two convictions for carrying a concealed
weapon, two convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia, minor misdemeanor
drug abuse, retail theft, driving under the influence, three convictions for invalid driver’s
license, driving without privileges, third-degree theft, misdemeanor possession of a
controlled substance, unauthorized use of property, and petit theft. (PSI, pp.5-9. 2) He
also has numerous charges for which no disposition was reported, including charges for
theft, driving under the influence, second-degree criminal trespass, and felony
possession of a controlled substance.

(PSI, pp.6-8.)

In addition, Spokas’ record

includes multiple probation violations and failures to appear. (PSI, pp.6-7, 9.)
In the instant offense, Spokas “grabbed [the victim] around the neck and pushed
her against the car underneath the carport.” (PSI, p.3.) He squeezed her neck until she
“felt dizzy” and she “fell to the ground next to the vehicle.” (PSI, p.3.) Spokas then fled
the scene and the victim remained on the ground for four to five minutes “because she
felt dizzy.” (PSI, p.3.) Officers later observed the victim had “a 2 ¼ inch bruise on the
right side of her neck,” and she reported “her neck was sore” and “she had pain in the
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front of her neck when she turned her head.” (PSI, p.3.) Despite the victim’s injuries,
Spokas refused to accept responsibility for his conduct, repeatedly blaming her and
claiming she “made all this up because she was mad at him” and/or “felt rejected by
him,” and stating “‘she is an accident prone alcoholic.’” (PSI, pp.4-5, 12, 15, 17, 108,
114.) At sentencing, the district court advised:
The difficulty that I have in sentencing in a case like this, Mr.
Spokas, is this. It’s difficult to structure rehabilitation terms for someone
who says they didn’t do it. In the end, that’s what you told the
presentence investigator; that you have no culpability in this and you place
all of the blame on your victim. And that makes it more difficult for me to
figure what an appropriate sentence is. Essentially I’m sentencing
somebody who does not uniformly agree that you did anything wrong that
brings you before this court for sentencing.
(Tr., p.36, Ls.14-24.)
The district court did not, as Spokas suggests, impose a longer sentence
“because of [Spokas’] Alford plea” (Appellant’s Brief, p.4); in fact, it imposed a lesser
sentence than was recommended by the state as part of the plea agreement (Tr., p.2,
Ls.10-15; p.30, Ls.3-4; p.38, Ls.5-10), taking into consideration Spokas’ continued
refusal to accept responsibility, attempts to blame the victim, denial that he has a
substance abuse or anger problem, and lack of amenability to treatment (PSI, pp.16-17,
24, 26, 114-16).
On appeal, Spokas contends the district court should have imposed a lesser
underlying sentence in light of his “struggles with alcohol” and because he “was under
the influence of alcohol” when he committed the instant offense. (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.3-4.)

However, Spokas denied having an alcohol problem and claimed he only
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “SPOKAS
43933 psi.pdf.”
4

consumed “‘maybe a beer’” on the day of the instant offense. (PSI, pp.5, 16, 24.) He
further denied having a substance abuse problem of any kind and stated he did not
need treatment. (PSI, pp.16, 24.) Yet, Spokas repeatedly missed his UA testing while
on pretrial release and, just two weeks before sentencing, he tested positive for both
alcohol and THC while at the courthouse. (R., pp.75-76; PSI, p.16.) The underlying
sentence imposed is reasonable in light of Spokas’ denial he has a substance abuse
problem, continued use of drugs and alcohol pending sentencing for the instant offense,
and lack of amenability to treatment.
In addition to his denial of a substance abuse problem and lack of amenability to
substance abuse treatment, Spokas claimed he “does not have an anger problem in
any way,” and he did not believe he required anger management or domestic violence
treatment. (PSI, pp.114, 116.) The domestic violence evaluator determined Spokas
presents “a medium risk for future domestic violence” and advised Spokas “does not
appear ready for treatment.” (PSI, pp.116-17.) The presentence investigator reported
Spokas presents a high risk to reoffend and recommended, “based on his continued
alcohol and drug use (which is suspected to be more than he reported), combined with
his denial of any accountability, Mr. Spokas may benefit from treatment within a
structured environment, such as a Retained Jurisdiction, in order to assess his
progress.” (PSI, pp.17, 20.)
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a
reasonable sentence. Spokas’ underlying sentence is appropriate in light of the serious
nature of the instant offense, Spokas’ history of criminal offending and violating his
probation, his refusal to accept responsibility for his criminal conduct and denial he has
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a substance abuse or anger problem, his lack of amenability to treatment, and his high
risk to reoffend. Given any reasonable view of the facts, Spokas has failed to establish
an abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Spokas’ conviction and
sentence.
DATED this 28th day of June, 2016.

__/s/_________________________
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_________________________
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Deputy Attorney General

6

